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La bombe dans mon jardin : les secrets de la poussière de Saddam veste rigide-
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Lieu où se trouve l'objet : Wilmington, California, États-Unis
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Numéro de l'objet eBay :265850334493
Caractéristiques de l'objet
- État
- Features
- Dust Jacket, Hardcover
- ISBN
- 9780471679653
- Book Title
- Bomb in My Garden : the Secrets of Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind
- Item Length
- 9.5in
- Publisher
- Wiley & Sons Canada, The Limited, John
- Publication Year
- 2004
- Format
- Hardcover
- Language
- English
- Item Height
- 0.9in
- Genre
- Biography & Autobiography, History, Political Science
- Topic
- Middle East / Iraq, Military / Nuclear Warfare, Modern / 21st Century, International Relations / Arms Control, Military / Iraq War (2003-2011), World / Middle Eastern, Science & Technology
- Item Width
- 6.2in
- Item Weight
- 16 Oz
- Number of Pages
- 256 Pages
À propos de ce produit
Product Information
A news-breaking inside look at Saddam's nuclear program-by the Iraqi scientist who ran it. No one knows more about Iraq's nuclear weapons program than Mahdi Obeidi, the man who headed its successful uranium enrichment effort. Now, at last, Obeidi tells all, taking us inside Saddam's regime and revealing the truth about its quest for nuclear weapons.
Product Identifiers
Publisher
Wiley & Sons Canada, The Limited, John
ISBN-10
0471679658
ISBN-13
9780471679653
eBay Product ID (ePID)
30784787
Product Key Features
Book Title
Bomb in My Garden : the Secrets of Saddam's Nuclear Mastermind
Format
Hardcover
Language
English
Topic
Middle East / Iraq, Military / Nuclear Warfare, Modern / 21st Century, International Relations / Arms Control, Military / Iraq War (2003-2011), World / Middle Eastern, Science & Technology
Publication Year
2004
Genre
Biography & Autobiography, History, Political Science
Number of Pages
256 Pages
Dimensions
Item Length
9.5in
Item Height
0.9in
Item Width
6.2in
Item Weight
16 Oz
Additional Product Features
Lc Classification Number
Ua853.I72
Reviews
* "Indispensable one...Expertly organized and packed with telling vignettes, it is never less than riveting." ( The New York Times Book Review , October 31, 2004) What was really going in Iraq before the American invasion last year? Iraq''s nuclear weapons program was on the threshold of success before the 1991 invasion of Kuwait - there is no doubt in my mind that we could have produced dozens of nuclear weapons within a few years - but was stopped in its tracks by United Nations weapons inspectors after the Persian Gulf war and was never restarted. During the 1990''s, the inspectors discovered all of the laboratories, machines and materials we had used in the nuclear program, and all were destroyed or otherwise incapacitated. By 1998, when Saddam Hussein evicted the weapons inspectors from Iraq, all that was left was the dangerous knowledge of hundreds of scientists and the blueprints and prototype parts for the centrifuge, which I had buried under a tree in my garden. In addition to the inspections, the sanctions that were put in place by the United Nations after the gulf war made reconstituting the program impossible. During the 1980''s, we had relied heavily on the international black market for equipment and technology; the sanctions closed that avenue. Another factor in the mothballing of the program was that Saddam Hussein was profiting handsomely from the United Nations oil-for-food program, building palaces around the country with the money he skimmed. I think he didn''t want to risk losing this revenue stream by trying to restart a secret weapons program. Over the course of the 1990''s, most of the scientists from the nuclear program switched to working on civilian projects or in conventional-weapons production, and the idea of building a nuclear bomb became a vague dream from another era. So, how could the West have made such a mistaken assessment of the nuclear program before the invasion last year? Even to those of us who knew better, it''s fairly easy to see how observers got the wrong impression. First, there was Saddam Hussein''s history. He had demonstrated his desire for nuclear weapons since the late 1970''s, when Iraqi scientists began making progress on a nuclear reactor. He had used chemical weapons against his own people and against Iran during the 1980''s. After the 1991 war, he had tried to hide his programs in weapons of mass destruction for as long as possible (he even kept my identity secret from weapons inspectors until 1995). It would have been hard not to suspect him of trying to develop such weapons again. The Western intelligence services and policy makers, however, overlooked some obvious clues. One was the defection and death of Saddam Hussein''s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, who was in charge of the unconventional weapons programs in the 1980''s. As my boss, Mr. Kamel was a brutal taskmaster who forced us to work under impossible deadlines and was the motivating force for our nuclear effort. The drive for nuclear weapons began in earnest when he rose to a position of power in 1987. He placed a detail of 20 fearsome security men on the premises of our centrifuge lab, and my staff and I worked wonders just to stay out of his dungeons. But after he defected to Jordan in 1995, and then returned months later only to be assassinated by his father-in-law''s henchmen, the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs lost their top promoter. In addition, the West never understood the delusional nature of Saddam Hussein''s mind. By 2002, when the United States and Britain were threatening war, he had lost touch with the reality of his diminished military might. By that time I had been promoted to director of projects for the country''s entire military-industrial complex, and I witnessed firsthand the fantasy world in which he was living. He backed mythic but hopeless projects like one for a long-range missile that was completely unrealistic considering the constraints of internatio, * "Indispensable one...Expertly organized and packed with telling vignettes, it is never less than riveting." ( The New York Times Book Review , October 31, 2004) What was really going in Iraq before the American invasion last year? Iraq''s nuclear weapons program was on the threshold of success before the 1991 invasion of Kuwait--there is no doubt in my mind that we could have produced dozens of nuclear weapons within a few years--but was stopped in its tracks by United Nations weapons inspectors after the Persian Gulf war and was never restarted. During the 1990''s, the inspectors discovered all of the laboratories, machines and materials we had used in the nuclear program, and all were destroyed or otherwise incapacitated. By 1998, when Saddam Hussein evicted the weapons inspectors from Iraq, all that was left was the dangerous knowledge of hundreds of scientists and the blueprints and prototype parts for the centrifuge, which I had buried under a tree in my garden. In addition to the inspections, the sanctions that were put in place by the United Nations after the gulf war made reconstituting the program impossible. During the 1980''s, we had relied heavily on the international black market for equipment and technology; the sanctions closed that avenue. Another factor in the mothballing of the program was that Saddam Hussein was profiting handsomely from the United Nations oil-for-food program, building palaces around the country with the money he skimmed. I think he didn''t want to risk losing this revenue stream by trying to restart a secret weapons program. Over the course of the 1990''s, most of the scientists from the nuclear program switched to working on civilian projects or in conventional-weapons production, and the idea of building a nuclear bomb became a vague dream from another era. So, how could the West have made such a mistaken assessment of the nuclear program before the invasion last year? Even to those of us who knew better, it''s fairly easy to see how observers got the wrong impression. First, there was Saddam Hussein''s history. He had demonstrated his desire for nuclear weapons since the late 1970''s, when Iraqi scientists began making progress on a nuclear reactor. He had used chemical weapons against his own people and against Iran during the 1980''s. After the 1991 war, he had tried to hide his programs in weapons of mass destruction for as long as possible (he even kept my identity secret from weapons inspectors until 1995). It would have been hard not to suspect him of trying to develop such weapons again. The Western intelligence services and policy makers, however, overlooked some obvious clues. One was the defection and death of Saddam Hussein''s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, who was in charge of the unconventional weapons programs in the 1980''s. As my boss, Mr. Kamel was a brutal taskmaster who forced us to work under impossible deadlines and was the motivating force for our nuclear effort. The drive for nuclear weapons began in earnest when he rose to a position of power in 1987. He placed a detail of 20 fearsome security men on the premises of our centrifuge lab, and my staff and I worked wonders just to stay out of his dungeons. But after he defected to Jordan in 1995, and then returned months later only to be assassinated by his father-in-law''s henchmen, the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs lost their top promoter. In addition, the West never understood the delusional nature of Saddam Hussein''s mind. By 2002, when the United States and Britain were threatening war, he had lost touch with the reality of his diminished military might. By that time I had been promoted to director of projects for the country''s entire military-industrial complex, and I witnessed firsthand the fantasy world in which he was living. He backed mythic but hopeless projects like one for a long-range missile that was completely unrealistic considering the constraints of international..., * ""Indispensable one...Expertly organized and packed with telling vignettes, it is never less than riveting."" ( The New York Times Book Review , October 31, 2004) What was really going in Iraq before the American invasion last year? Iraq''s nuclear weapons program was on the threshold of success before the 1991 invasion of Kuwait - there is no doubt in my mind that we could have produced dozens of nuclear weapons within a few years - but was stopped in its tracks by United Nations weapons inspectors after the Persian Gulf war and was never restarted. During the 1990''s, the inspectors discovered all of the laboratories, machines and materials we had used in the nuclear program, and all were destroyed or otherwise incapacitated. By 1998, when Saddam Hussein evicted the weapons inspectors from Iraq, all that was left was the dangerous knowledge of hundreds of scientists and the blueprints and prototype parts for the centrifuge, which I had buried under a tree in my garden. In addition to the inspections, the sanctions that were put in place by the United Nations after the gulf war made reconstituting the program impossible. During the 1980''s, we had relied heavily on the international black market for equipment and technology; the sanctions closed that avenue. Another factor in the mothballing of the program was that Saddam Hussein was profiting handsomely from the United Nations oil-for-food program, building palaces around the country with the money he skimmed. I think he didn''t want to risk losing this revenue stream by trying to restart a secret weapons program. Over the course of the 1990''s, most of the scientists from the nuclear program switched to working on civilian projects or in conventional-weapons production, and the idea of building a nuclear bomb became a vague dream from another era. So, how could the West have made such a mistaken assessment of the nuclear program before the invasion last year? Even to those of us who knew better, it''s fairly easy to see how observers got the wrong impression. First, there was Saddam Hussein''s history. He had demonstrated his desire for nuclear weapons since the late 1970''s, when Iraqi scientists began making progress on a nuclear reactor. He had used chemical weapons against his own people and against Iran during the 1980''s. After the 1991 war, he had tried to hide his programs in weapons of mass destruction for as long as possible (he even kept my identity secret from weapons inspectors until 1995). It would have been hard not to suspect him of trying to develop such weapons again. The Western intelligence services and policy makers, however, overlooked some obvious clues. One was the defection and death of Saddam Hussein''s son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, who was in charge of the unconventional weapons programs in the 1980''s. As my boss, Mr. Kamel was a brutal taskmaster who forced us to work under impossible deadlines and was the motivating force for our nuclear effort. The drive for nuclear weapons began in earnest when he rose to a position of power in 1987. He placed a detail of 20 fearsome security men on the premises of our centrifuge lab, and my staff and I worked wonders just to stay out of his dungeons. But after he defected to Jordan in 1995, and then returned months later only to be assassinated by his father-in-law''s henchmen, the nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs lost their top promoter. In addition, the West never understood the delusional nature of Saddam Hussein''s mind. By 2002, when the United States and Britain were threatening war, he had lost touch with the reality of his diminished military might. By that time I had been promoted to director of projects for the country''s entire military-industrial complex, and I witnessed firsthand the fantasy world in which he was living. He backed mythic but hopeless projects like one for a long-range missile that was completely unrealistic considering the constraints of internatio, Praise for The Bomb in My Garden "This one book will tell you more about Iraq's quest for weapons of mass destruction than all U.S. intelligence on the subject. It is a fascinating and rare glimpse inside Saddam Hussein's Iraq-and inside a tyrant's mind." --Fareed Zakaria author of The Future of Freedom " The Bomb in My Garden is important and utterly gripping. The old cliché is true-you start reading, and you don't want to stop. Mahdi Obeidi's story makes clear how hard Saddam Hussein tried to develop a nuclear weapon, and the reasons he fell short. It is also unforgettable as a picture of how honorable people tried to cope with a despot's demands. I enthusiastically recommend this book." --James Fallows, National Correspondent, The Atlantic Monthly "Obeidi was the key scientist in Saddam's centrifuge program, and he was central when they tried to conceal it. He was already thought to be too friendly to the weapons inspectors, and he showed considerable personal courage in coming forward as he did during very unsettled conditions after the war." --David Kay, former UN weapons inspector and Head of the Iraqi Survey Group in charge of searching for weapons of mass destruction
Table of Content
Preface. 1. The Bomb in My Garden. 2. Early Ambitions. 3. The Centrifuge. 4. Saddam's Grip. 5. Shopping in Europe. 6. The Crash Program. 7. Nuclear Hide-and-Seek. 8. The Dark Years. 9. The March to War. 10. The Time Capsule. Epilogue. Acknowledgments. Index.
Copyright Date
2004
Target Audience
Trade
Lccn
2004-015415
Dewey Decimal
956.7044/092 B
Dewey Edition
22
Description de l'objet fournie par le vendeur
Le vendeur assume l'entière responsabilité de cette annonce.
Numéro de l'objet eBay :265850334493
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Lieu où se trouve l'objet :
Wilmington, California, États-Unis
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